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An island of constancy in a sea of change: rethinking project temporalities with long-
term megaprojects 
 
Abstract: 
This paper examines the organizational phenomena of long-term projects. While the research 
literature frames projects as “temporary organizations”, megaprojects may have very long 
initiation and delivery phases, which may last for many years, sometimes even decades, and 
they deliver capital assets that are used for decades or centuries. Instead of a short-duration 
activity within a fixed organizational context, these projects involve multiple temporalities, 
with a range of more and less temporary forms of organizing combining in the process of 
enactment. Drawing on an example of a long-term infrastructural megaproject, a wind-farm, 
to illustrate the phenomenon, we contribute by articulating different temporalities associated 
with the delivery project, the life-cycle; the stakeholder organizations that set up the project; 
and the special purpose vehicles through which it is delivered and, with reference to 
understandings of risk and knowledge, consider some implications for these temporalities 
project management research and practice. We argue that focus on the multiple temporalities 
associated with long-term projects opens up new ways of thinking about projects as 
temporary organizations for researchers and practitioners.  
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Highlights 
• Examines the organizational phenomena of long-term projects  
• Articulates how these projects involve multiple temporalities  
• In them; the project, stakeholders and special purpose vehicles differ temporally  
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• The project may outlive owner and delivery firms; end dates may be negotiated  
• Focus on multiple temporalities offers new insight for researchers and practitioners 
•  
Introduction 
 
When practitioners and scholars label an entity a ‘project’ they typically demarcate an 
organizational form that is less temporally durable than its surrounding organizational 
domain (PMBOK, 2013; Turner and Müller, 2003). Assumptions about the relative 
impermanence of a project vis-à-vis it organizational milieu encompass both academic 
treatises on projects as ‘temporary organizations’ (e.g. Bakker, 2010; Bakker et al., 2016; 
Bechky, 2006; Burke and Morley, 2016; Jacobsson et al., 2015; Packendorff, 1995) and 
definitions of projects used by professional project management associations (Caupin et al., 
1999; PMBOK, 2013). The Project Management Institute’s (PMI) Project Management 
Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) explicitly delineates its domain of knowledge from other 
management activities through the relative temporariness of projects:  
 
 Operations are ongoing endeavours that produce repetitive outputs, with resources 
 assigned to do basically the same set of tasks according to the standards 
 institutionalized in a product life cycle. Unlike the ongoing nature of operations, 
 projects are temporary endeavours (PMBOK, 2013: 12).   
 
Similarly, academic research on projects as temporary organizations has consistently drawn 
attention to ‘Perceived time limits’ on projects as ‘as one property that differentiates 
temporary organizations from most of their permanent counterparts’ (Packendorff, 1995: 
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327). Or, as Jacobsson et al. (2015) more recently explain, the project as temporary 
organization is to be defined as ‘being more or less determinate in its lifespan, as opposed to 
permanent organizations being indeterminate’ (p15). Such views are often conflated with, 
and affirm, a parallel assumption that projects are outlasted by a surrounding milieu of more 
enduring organizational forms. The assumption that projects are outlasted by a surrounding 
milieu of more enduring organizational forms is arguably the defining image of organization 
used to apprehend this organizational entity. Consequently, most scholarly deliberations on 
projects are predicated on a contrast between the temporalities of projects and ‘permanent 
contexts’ (Sydow et al., 2004: 1477) – that is, between project time as a ‘dedicated urgency 
and stimulating scarcity’ (Packendorff, 1995: 327) and an organizational milieu where time 
is ‘eternal’ (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995: 450), composed of ‘ongoing and repetitive 
business processes’ (Grabher, 2004: 1477) and ‘enduring interpersonal networks, epistemic 
communities and industries’ (Bakker, 2010: 480). Such work has focused on contexts in 
which a well-established project-based organization has multiple projects (e.g. in oil and gas 
(Prado and Sapsed, 2016); or in film (Stjerne and Svejenova, 2016)). From instrumentalist 
approaches to ensure project control (PMBOK, 2013), through deliberations on the 
challenges of project-firm learning and innovation (Brady and Davies, 2004; Grabher, 
2004), to critical expositions of work intensification (Andersson and Wickelgrenn, 2009; 
Clegg and Courpasson, 2004), project research is persistently prefigured on a dichotomy of 
durability between a longer lasting organizational milieu and an ephemeral project.  
 
Our starting point in this theoretically orientated paper is to interrogate the limits and 
significance of this temporal configuration, as found both within the theorization of projects 
as temporary organizations, and project management research. In so doing we consider a 
group of projects that while they adhere to many of the defining features of projects, from 
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the presence of externally imposed goals and defined time limits (PMBOK, 2013; Lundin 
and Söderholm, 1995; Jacobbson et al. 2015), often, endure, and are often perceived from 
the outset to endure, far beyond the life of their surrounding organizations: long-term 
infrastructure megaprojects. Despite their increasing prevalence, size and complexity 
(Davies et al., 2009; Eweje et al., 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2014; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Giezen, 
2012; Kardes et al., 2013; Ruuska et al., 2011; van Marrewijk et al., 2008), the temporality 
of megaprojects has had limited attention: they have only fleetingly featured within the 
theorization of projects as temporary organizations. Although, as Jacobsson et al. (2015: 15) 
make clear, the time criterion to consider projects as temporary organizations relates not to 
their short duration but to their fixed longevity (cf. Grabher, 2002: 207; PMBOK, 2013), 
long-term projects are nevertheless routinely marginalized within the theorization of 
temporary organizations. Sydow et al. (2004), for instance, surmise that while projects 
lasting over a few years are temporary organizations, their learning processes are likely ‘not 
very different from those of permanent organizations’ (p. 1481). Equally, Jacobsson et al. 
(2015: 15) note there exist ‘exceptional examples of temporary organizations that have 
outlasted the permanent organization’, yet they then refrain from evidencing the empirical 
prevalence or theoretical significance of such a seemingly incongruous temporal 
configuration.  
 
Set against this under-theorization, the aim of our paper is to consider how the longer time 
duration of some projects, such as infrastructural megaprojects, interacts with an often less 
obdurate, more capricious, organizational milieu. In so doing we will then consider some of 
the possible implications of such less discussed organizational temporalities for the 
development of theories of temporary organization (Jacobsson et al., 2015; Lundin and 
Söderholm, 2013). Although partly informed by research on the management of 
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megaprojects (Eweje et al., 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2014), our paper departs from this body of 
work by considering the implications of conceptualizing such long-term projects as 
‘temporary organizations’, wherein the purpose of research is to ‘understand project 
phenomena, rather than find prescriptions and tools’ (Jacobsson et al., 2015: 11). As such, 
our paper principally engages with, and problematizes existing research conceptualizing the 
temporalities between temporary and permanent organizing (Bakker, 2010; Bakker et al. 
2016; Bechky, 2006; Burke and Morley, 2016; Lundin and Söderholm, 1995; Packendorff, 
1995; Sydow et al. 2004; Tyssen et al. 2014). Although some work has begun to 
acknowledge and explore the temporalities of project (Gustavsson and Hallin, 2015; Ligthart 
et al., 2016) and megaproject (Marrewijk et al., 2016), organizing, there is a lack of research 
reflecting on the temporalities of long-term project organizing.  In order to flesh out the 
significance of our engagement with this empirical phenomenon we focus here upon its 
implications for how risk is understood and knowledge generated and shared across the 
multiple temporalities that characterise major infrastructure projects. Our decision to focus 
here upon risk and knowledge is intended to offer an exemplification of the extent to which 
recognizing the multiple temporalities of megaproject organizing, poses theoretical 
questions that open up new avenues for empirical research for both project management, and 
temporary organization, researchers.        
 
In the next section, we examine current conceptualisations of the relative temporalities of 
projects and their contexts, and how a particular assumption that projects will be outlasted 
by their organizational milieus inflects how they are usually understood and managed. To 
address the more practical and tangible implications of these temporal assumptions, we then 
discuss how they underpin current engagements with project risk and knowledge.  In the 
following two sections, we then characterize the multiple temporalities of long-term project 
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organizing drawing upon empirical data generated by a pan-European study of 
infrastructural megaprojects. An example of a long-term infrastructural megaproject – a 
large off-shore wind farm in the United Kingdom – is discussed to illustrate the complex 
temporal configurations of megaprojects. In our discussion section, the empirical analysis is 
then used to discuss the relevance of long-term megaprojects to open up new questions and 
avenues for research in the projects as temporary organization literature. We find the project 
itself may outlive the associated owner and delivery firms involved in its delivery; and has 
multiple temporalities associated with the delivery project; life-cycle; stakeholder 
organizations that set up the project; and the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) through 
which many long-term projects are delivered. In the final section of the paper, we conclude 
by examining how the phenomenon of long-term projects may require us to rethink some of 
the founding assumptions of how we apprehend projects as both temporary organizations 
(Lundin and Söderholm, 1995; Jacobbson et al. 2015), with a particular reference to issues 
of risk and knowledge management, and how the idea of multiple temporalities may open up 
new ways of thinking for researchers and practitioners.  
 
The relative temporalities of projects and their environments  
 
Understandings of projects are highly pluralistic in terms of their epistemologies, methods 
and metaphors of organization (Bredillet, 2008; Söderlund, 2011; Turner et al., 2013; Winter 
and Szczepanek, 2009). There is general agreement that projects need to be understood in 
relation to their organizational context (Engwall, 2003); that megaprojects and their contexts 
are mutually interdependent (Millar and Lessard, 2001); and as Söderlund (2004: 185) 
identifies, projects are relatively ephemeral within wider organizational contexts. 
Nevertheless there are discernible differences of emphasis in how and why such relative 
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impermanence is articulated, whether in terms of project duration, goal orientation and 
relationships with permanent organizations.  
 
Interpretations of the duration of projects as temporary organizations vary widely. Bechky 
(2006), for example, characterizes temporary organizations as ‘flexible, discontinuous and, 
ephemeral’ (p3). For others, such as Sydow et al. (2004), absolute quantitative limits can be 
placed around the notion of projects as temporary organizations, such that temporary 
organizing explicitly corresponds with the short-term projects, with an assumption that 
learning processes in long-term projects, of over 5 years, are more similar to that of firms 
(for a similar short-term definition see Tyssen et al. 2014). Other researchers consider that 
organizations with a time-span of over 5-10 years should be considered as temporary 
organizations if their lifespan is finite: 
 
There seems to be a debate in the literature on whether systems of relatively longer 
duration (although still limited by a deadline in a distant future) should be called 
‘temporary’. The dominant view suggests they should (Bakker, 2010: p. 474). 
 
In the light of the above definition, in which the notion of temporary organization is about 
time boundaries that are established ex-ante (see also Bakker et al. 2016) rather than their 
absolute short duration, it becomes meaningful to consider long-term infrastructural 
megaprojects as temporary organizations. Indeed, citing the case of the Hultsfred Festival 
(Lindgren and Packendorff, 2005), Jacobsson et al. (2015: 15) suggest there exist in the 
extant literature at least one exceptional example of a temporary organization that outlasts 
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its surrounding organizational milieu (Karmowska et al., 2016). The empirical case of 
long-term infrastructural megaprojects suggests that such examples are increasingly far 
from exceptional, and indeed worthy of greater theorization. 
 
As is evident, researchers have increasingly resisted absolutist duration-based definitions 
of projects as short-term temporary organization (as in Sydow et al., 2004), and instead 
moved towards a definition of projects as temporal organizations on the basis of their ex-
ante time-defined goals (Bakker, 2010; Bakker et al., 2016; Hanisch and Wald, 2014; 
Jacobsson et al., 2015; Maaninen-Olsson and Müllern, 2009). Thus Burke and Morley 
(2016) explain: ‘Despite the subtle nuances in emphasis, all definitions do agree that 
temporary organizations have an ex ante determined termination point’ (p1237). Unlike 
permanent organizations, temporary organizations can thus be further characterised as 
being tasked to achieve a particular objective (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995), set and 
monitored by a long-lasting organizational milieu. Thus Kenis et al. (2009) define a 
temporary organization as follows: 
 
A temporary organization forms for the purpose of accomplishing an ex-ante 
determined task that has a pre-determined termination point. It can be intra-
organizational, occurring within an existing non-temporary organization, or inter-
organizational, a joint collaboration amongst a number of organizations (Kenis et 
al., 2009: p. 2 [italics in original]).  
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As Kenis et al. (2009) indicate, the traditional view is that projects sit within firms, or 
across groups of firms, and that these firms outlive projects. This relatively durability is 
assumed because it is this milieu of external organizations that establishes and controls 
goals for the project, giving rise to another recurring definitional condition of temporary 
organizations: their ‘institutionalized termination’ (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Thus, 
any project goal is said to require an ex-ante termination date whether ‘fixed either by a 
specific date or by the attainment of a predefined state or condition’ (Bakker et al., 2009: 
203). This latter caveat is important in indicating an analytical distinction between defined 
temporariness, where a fixed goal is completed on time, and a project is terminated as 
planned, and precarious temporariness, where a goal shifts and thus project termination is 
extended but still mandated and always sought after (Karmowska et al., 2016). Thinking 
along these lines, Gustavasson and Hallin (2015) make a similar analytical distinction in 
their framing of projects as temporary organizations, between ‘goal-orientated’ projects 
with predetermined ex-ante time boundaries and ‘goal-seeking’ projects that are working 
towards the definition of ex-ante time boundaries. Both project types can thus be regarded 
temporary organizations on the basis of an existing or aspirational ex-ante time-limited 
duration. Indeed, as Jacobsson et al. (2015) explain, a defining feature of the temporary 
organization is the ‘external organizational requirement or pressure in terms of one or more 
of … goal, expectation, or control’ (p15).  
 
We herein follow the emerging consensus in previous work that suggests it is their pre-
determined duration, whether on the basis of existing, or aspired, time-based or other 
goals, that defines projects as temporary organizations. But, in so doing, we also want to 
draw attention to a less considered assumption regarding relative temporalities within work 
on projects as temporary organizations. That is, despite the shift away from absolutist 
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definitions of temporary organizations as short-term towards time prescribed definitions of 
temporary organizing, the temporary organization literature remains predicated on a 
naturalized temporal distinction from permanent organization. In their seminal writing on 
the subject, Lundin and Söderholm (1995) describe this difference thus: 
 
For firms whose future is perceived as eternal, the future will naturally continue to be 
seen as eternity: the result of subtracting any finite number from infinity always 
leaves infinity. For the temporary organization, on the other hand, time is always 
running out since it is finite from the start, limited for instance by contracts or other 
conditions (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995: p. 439).  
 
The difficulty with this distinction is that it suggests that members of ‘permanent’ 
organizations perceive that their organization will last into infinity and on this basis it is to 
be regarded as permanent. It is easy to evidence that a project, whose purpose involves its 
extinction, will not last forever, and is thus a temporary organization (Packendorff, 1995; 
Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). However this rather safe assumption has seemingly been 
conflated with a much more difficult assumption: organizing around an ex-ante termination 
date means that the temporary organization is always relatively less durable, or lacking in 
‘permanence’, relative to organizations without such a date. It is this assumption around 
temporary organizing, that remains mostly assumed rather than empirically tested, that 
forms the point of theoretical departure for this paper.  
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The recurrent naturalized distinction between the temporalities of ‘permanent’ and 
‘temporary’ organizing in the literature (Bakker et al. 2016; Burke and Morley, 2016; 
Tyssen et al. 2014) evidences a pervasive lack of reflection on the assumption that 
impermanence always goes hand in hand with a pre-set organizational duration. Bakker et 
al. (2016), for example, develop a typological distinction as a continuum between temporary 
and permanent organization, wherein ‘only the classic permanent organizational form … is 
typically not related to temporary organizing efforts’ (p1706). As they then explain: 
‘temporary in our view should refer to predetermined duration, i.e., whether at the outset the 
time boundaries of an organizational process or venture are explicitly set...’ whereas 
‘“permanent” in this view is understood as “indeterminate”—that is, open-ended with regard 
to time horizon’ (Bakker et al, 2016: 1708). This seemingly straightforward distinction 
glosses over the empirical complexities that long-term infrastructural megaprojects, and 
other organizational forms present in assuming that ‘permanence’, or a perception of 
increased organizational permanence, is always an outcome of a lack of organizing a defined 
termination date. After all, no organizations will last to eternity, and all are in any case 
always in a state of flux or becoming (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002).  More empirically, a 2002 
survey of Fortune 500 companies reveals an average lifespan of just 40 to 50 years (De 
Geus, 2002); while equally in the US, the average time spent in one company is just 4.6 
years within an average career lifespan of just under four decades (Department of Labor, 
2016).  
 
Long-term megaprojects with fixed termination dates of one or more decades, may, in the 
context of employee and organizational temporalities, readily presage a relative increase in 
durability and permanence over and above organizations with no fixed termination date. As 
Gustavsson and Hallin (2015) put it: ‘In today’s “post-bureaucratic” organizations, 
12 
 
characterized by turbulence and constant restructuring, the project in many cases stands for 
permanence, for example, rather than temporality’ (p371).  Long-term megaprojects have, or 
look to have, a pre-defined duration, and, as such, can be considered temporary 
organizations (Bakker et al. 2016). And yet, it is considerable more difficult to empirically 
evidence they are always less enduring, or permanent, than the organizational milieu that 
surrounds them, or indeed initiates and controls their ‘institutional termination’. Indeed, the 
surrounding organizational milieu, let alone members, that set or seek their initial goals, and 
end date, are highly unlikely to remain the same through to the point of that termination.  
 
Understanding the significance of relative temporalities through project risk and 
knowledge 
 
Given the extent to which the concept of the temporary organization has become analytically 
unclear, not least because of the difficulty in empirically validating abstract temporal 
dichotomies between temporary and permanent organization, we propose that what is 
required is further empirical analysis of concepts associated with temporary organization 
that tests, and challenges, rather than confirms the limits of their applicability. In order to 
develop such an analysis we briefly review two strands of understanding related to projects 
as temporary organizations on risk and knowledge. These strands are mobilized because of 
their significance within the projects as temporary organization literature (and related project 
management literature), and because they are prefigured upon, and serve to reinforce, an 
assumption of the relative impermanence of projects vis-à-vis their surrounding 
organizational milieu. Our aim in engaging these concepts here is to highlight what is at 
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stake in our understanding of projects as temporary organizations when we can no longer 
assume the relative permanence of a surrounding organizational milieu.  
 
Risk has long been a central strand in the way projects are defined as relatively less durable 
than their organizational milieu. The Guide to the PMBOK (2013) repeatedly evokes the 
concept of risk to articulate a boundary between the ephemeral project and its external milieu 
of permanent organizational stakeholders. Unexpected changes to project goals (e.g. 
increases in the scope of the project) and resources (e.g. increases in staff time or delays in 
budget approvals), mandated by permanent organizations, are herein related to positive 
(opportunities) and negative risks this might present to the one or more permanent 
organizations with a stake in the project; this diagnosis feeds into an evolving and 
probabilistic risk management plan which categorizes risk on the basis of their probability 
and impact on the same permanent organizations, taking into account prefigured risk 
appetites and tolerances. This risk management plan can then be used by project stakeholders 
to track old and new risks and define risk control strategies in advance of their emergence 
(PMBOK, 2013).  
 
As Hanisch and Ward (2014) indicate, in their consideration of complexity in temporary 
organizations, what underpins the way risk is understood in projects, and other temporary 
organizations, is a contrast with permanent organizing, categorized as ‘Low degree of 
novelty, less uncertainty and risk, routine-based work’ (PMBOK, 2013: 199). Indeed, as the 
PMBOK (2013) approach illustrates, it is only from the purview of a contrasting permanent 
organization where uniqueness, and thus complexity and unpredictability, is relatively 
minimal, that risks within a project, and around a project context, can be effectively managed. 
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To make this point clearer still, imagine a counter-example – a project where the stakeholder 
organizations involved were too ephemeral to purposefully identify their risk appetites or 
tolerances or indeed track risks across a project. Such a project is clearly difficult to view 
positively in terms of stability, from the point of view of how the PMBOK define risk 
management. The root assumption at work here in these deliberations on risk management is 
that a project is a relatively less durable temporary organization, with a defined termination 
date, that will typically, though certainly not always (Engwall, 2003; Grabher, 2004), be a 
conduit through which more unique and thus complex, unpredictable and risky work is 
undertaken (Burke and Morley, 2016; Hobday, 2000; Packendorff, 1995). Permanent 
organizing is not viewed as less risky because it is geographically commonplace but rather 
because it is temporally consistent, and thus benefits from an accumulated knowledge base, 
and heightened level of trust in that knowledge, from which risk can be more effectively 
controlled and ‘optimum practice is possible’ (Atkinson et al. 2006: 693). The question which 
we will revisit in the subsequent sections of this paper is how we might rethink project risk in 
a temporary organization such as a long-term infrastructural megaproject where an 
accumulated knowledge based might accrue within, not beyond, the project. In order to 
further refine our exploration of this subject we will now consider another strand of 
understanding projects as temporary organizations which is heavily predicated on their 
relative impermanence – knowledge.  
 
The relative impermanence of projects as temporary organizational forms vis-à-vis a 
permanent organizational milieu is also persistently identified as a key feature and challenge 
for knowledge management in projects. The central concern here is a ‘learning paradox’ 
(Bakker et al. 2011) which is frequently said to surround project work wherein, while 
projects are, as a result of their unique task focus often an excellent domain for context-
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specific knowledge creation (Grabher, 2004; Hobday, 2000; Lundin and Söderholm, 1995; 
Prencipe and Tell, 2001), their relative impermanence has a major negative impact on 
knowledge sharing: 
 
… the temporary nature of projects by the same token seems to inhibit the 
sedimentation of knowledge, because when the project dissolves and participants 
move on, the created knowledge is likely to disperse (Bakker et al., 2011).  
 
Such sentiments on the organizational amnesia of projects as temporary, time-limited, 
organizations, and the wider knowledge learning paradox have been repeatedly 
acknowledged in the literature (Brady and Davies, 2004; Burke and Morley, 2016; Grabher, 
2004; Hobday, 2000; Scarborough et al. 2004; Sydow et al. 2004). And just as with risk, here 
the concept of knowledge helps clearly articulate the significance of a temporary boundary 
between the relative impermanence of a less durable, time-limited project and a surrounding 
indefinite, more permanent, organizational milieu of project stakeholders. Responding to this 
view, Bakker et al (2011), describe how the level of connectivity, or embeddedness, between 
the parent organization(s) around the project, enables successful knowledge management 
within temporary organizing. In other words, while the relatively less permanent project itself 
might be prone to organizational amnesia, this can be mitigated if it is sufficiently well 
connected to a wider set of time indefinite relationships, that take shape within (Brady and 
Davies, 2004) and between parent firms, epistemic communities and personal networks 
(Prencipe and Tell, 2001; Grabher, 2004; Scarborough et al. 2004). To this end, Bakker et al 
(2011) identify various factors influencing knowledge sharing between the permanent 
organizations involved in the project, including relational embeddedness (frequency of 
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interactions creating trust and resource commitments), cognitive embeddedness (shared 
meanings leading to mutual understanding but sufficient differences to enable learning) and 
temporary embeddedness (longevity of relationship creating structures for knowledge sharing 
and a shared knowledge-base), along with their accompanying ability to absorb and recognize 
the value of knowledge and motivations (willingness to share knowledge). Bakker et al’s 
(2011) empirical research suggests that: ‘there is a clear and unambiguous responsibility of 
the project owner (the permanent parent organization) in project knowledge transfer’ (Bakker 
et al. 2011: 502).  
 
Set against the empirical context of our research, what is missing from these debates is the 
extent to which a project, time bounded by decades, rather than years, retains its primacy, 
over a time indefinite (often shorter lived) organizational milieu, as a domain for risk control 
(Hanisch and Ward, 2014) and knowledge exploration over exploitation (Brady and Davies, 
2004). Such important questions remains unaddressed when researchers continue to 
naturalize the dichotomous view of project temporalities as less durable than their 
environment as a result of their existing, or desired, time-limited duration (Bakker et al. 
2016). In what follows we will challenge this assumption, and by extension address the 
questions this challenge possess for our exemplary concepts of risk and knowledge, with 
reference to our empirical context – long-term infrastructural megaprojects. 
 
Long-term infrastructure megaprojects as temporary organizations: characterizing the 
phenomenon 
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Large infrastructure projects are ‘megaprojects’, where these are defined loosely as those 
projects with budgets of over $1 billion (Davies et al., 2009; Eweje et al., 2012; Flyvbjerg et 
al., 2003; Kardes et al., 2013; Merrow, 2011) with some project costs, for example in nuclear 
decommissioning, now reach up to and beyond $100bn (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2014). The 
characteristics of such projects are significantly different from those which take place within 
a single firm and are of a short duration, for example in new product development. 
Megaprojects are of significant scale and delivered through coalitions and collaborations 
across the boundaries of firms and they have extended delivery phases, which take years and 
sometimes decades. The phenomenon of megaprojects has been examined largely in relation 
to external stakeholders, front-end decisions and impacts: the poor performance of 
megaproject delivery (Flyvbjerg, 2014; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003); the political nature of 
strategic decisions about which projects to fund, and the associated corruption (Marrewijk, 
2015; Nguh, 2013), and the broader societal consequences of these projects (e.g. Müller, 
2011). Relatively less attention has been paid to their potential to be understood from the 
analytical prism of projects as temporary organization (Bakker et al. 2016), and thus their 
multiple, and complex, temporalities have been overlooked. Yet as we have sought to show 
above there is an emerging consensus that any time-bound organizational form is a temporary 
organizations (Bakker et al. 2016: 1708). Long-term infrastructure megaprojects can thus be 
defined as temporary organizations with contractually limited lifespans and temporal phases 
(Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). The legal entities, the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), that 
are set up to deliver them may similarly be regarded as temporary organizations if their 
existence is legally or de facto linked to the achievement of defined project goals (Brookes 
and Sainati, 2015). These firms are typically involved across the operational lifetime of the 
assets (from construction to decommissioning), which may be years, decades or, in a few 
cases, such as railways, centuries. And yet, the sponsoring firms that establish projects and 
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SPEs, set and monitor goals, and resource them, might endure for far less time despite their 
indefinite termination dates. In short, viewed as temporary organizations, megaprojects are 
troublesome cases. While temporary organizations, they are far from temporary relative to 
most other organizations. In fact they often last longer than the supposedly stable and 
permanent forms of organization through which they are created and associated. They thus 
resist and complicate the prevailing dichotomous view of project temporalities introduced 
thus far within this paper, suggesting instead the need to consider a more complex set of 
multiple temporalities within their project ecologies.  
 
<<Insert Table 1 here>> 
 
Table 1 compares the characteristics of long-term projects with the way that projects are 
described as temporary organizations. Some of the recent work on megaprojects 
problematizes what is meant by a project or a temporary organization, it draws attention to 
the changing boundary between project delivery and operations; to the multi-organization 
nature of delivery and to the SPV or firm within the evolving inter-firm coalition that delivers 
the project. 
 
In seeking to understand the multiple temporalities of long-term megaproject it is important 
to establish their typical ecologies (Grabher, 2004) and some important factors complicating 
a consideration of their temporalities. In the context of such projects, the term ‘ecology’ 
refers to the environment of the project, with its surrounding set of other involved 
organizations, which may be public or private (Lobo and Whyte, 2017; Winch, 2013). First, it 
is crucial to define when a long-term infrastructural megaproject begins and ends. This 
seemingly straightforward question is complicated by contractual arrangements such as 
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Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) which may involve separate, or singular, firms across the 
initiation, delivery, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of infrastructure. One 
way to theorize this situation is to see megaprojects as time-limited delivery projects, handing 
over to an operation phase, with a multiplicity of temporalities and patterns of temporariness 
and continuity across this hand-over. In this instance, a termination phase could be defined as 
the formal opening, or commissioning, of the piece of infrastructure for regular use by the 
operations team. Another approach is to argue that projects themselves encompass an 
operation phase. Alderman et al. (2014), for example, highlight a service-led operational 
phase associated with train, sewerage and port equipment projects. They see all stages of 
project delivery as increasingly influenced by the client’s customers (Alderman et al., 2014) 
as well as by the environment, supply network and client, as a result of this greater level of 
integration between delivery and operation. A more radical view, as indicated in simplified 
form in Figure 1, would be that in long-term projects the whole life-cycle of the infrastructure 
is one project (Alderman et al., 2014; Brady et al., 2005): that includes the initiation, 
delivery, operation and decommissioning of infrastructure.  
 
<<Insert Figure 1 here>> 
 
These multiple termination dates are far from unusual and are suggestive of a deeper 
complication to an analysis of megaproject temporalities, namely that different stakeholder 
organizations might view the temporalities of certain megaproject differently dependent upon 
their particular engagement with it. That is, there may be no universally agreed upon 
termination date but rather prospective multiple termination dates which correspond with 
distinct project phases spanning decades or even centuries.  
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Another complicating ingredient in the temporalities of such megaprojects is that there is a 
widespread use of a form of project organization that was founded on employing an equity-
based SPV. This organization has a specific purpose to design, deliver and sometimes to 
operate large scale infrastructure megaprojects. Special purpose vehicles are legal entities 
(usually a limited company of some type or, sometimes, a limited partnership) created to 
fulfil specific objectives (Sainati et al., forthcoming). Once these objectives are fulfilled the 
SPV will usually be dissolved as its existence is either legally or de facto linked to pre-
defined project goals which are themselves time-limited (Brookes and Sainati, 2015). In this 
sense, this kind of firm, while often lacking an explicit, legal, termination date, and thus 
failing to adhere directly to some definitions of a temporary organization (Bakker et al. 
2016), might be regarded as a temporary organization by proxy as its existence is inextricably 
linked to the ex-ante, temporal goals of the project. While the use of SPVs has received 
attention in the project literature (Daube et al., 2008; Grimsey and Lewis, 2002) the 
implications of these forms has not been considered beyond their ability to mitigate and share 
risks, with limited exceptions (e.g. Smyth and Edkins, 2007). To fully consider long-term 
megaprojects as temporary organizations, we must examine the full range of uses of SPVs 
from purely financial instruments to organizational structures, governance mechanisms and 
temporary contexts in which complex behaviours are enacted.  
 
Set against these temporarily bounded, but somewhat long lasting, temporary organizations, 
the organizational and commercial context within which such long-term projects are 
developed is increasingly dynamic and unpredictable (Flvvbjerg, 2014; Pitsis et al. 2003; 
Williams et al. 2015), challenging assumptions of unchanging firms in stable industries. To 
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this end scholars have examined how project cultures, and differences between the project 
culture of the megaproject and associated organizations can affect performance in the face of 
pervasive uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity in project environments (van Marrewijk et 
al., 2008) and how strategic decisions within megaprojects are negotiated with external 
stakeholders (Lundrigan et al., 2014). While some, such as Sanderson (2012), have argued 
the organizational milieu that constitutes megaprojects is so dynamic, it demands new 
epistemological and methodological approaches wherein knowledge is derived from practices 
of spontaneous governing in and around projects not simply from the ex-ante governance 
calculations and decisions of ‘permanent’ sponsoring organizations. 
 
The megaproject ecology encompasses a complex mix of multiple temporalities spanning a 
multiplicity of time-limited goals within a project plan, a goal-limited SPV, and a capacious 
mix of time-indefinite project sponsors, contractors, supply chains, and other stakeholders. 
Notwithstanding this temporal complexity, all long-term infrastructure megaprojects can 
readily be said to adhere to all the characteristics frequently ascribed to the three conditions 
that Jacobsson et al. (2015) proposes define temporary organization: (i) external pressure (for 
goal, expectation, control); (ii) internal management (of team, task, time); and a (iii) choice 
process and an ‘end state’ that is to be or has to be reached. In affirming this categorisation 
we intend to unpack the creatively troublesome implications for how we might understand 
megaprojects, and other long-term projects, as temporary organizations. To illustrate more 
precisely what is at stake here we now turn towards the case of the Greater Gabbard Offshore 
Windfarm (Brookes, 2015). A more detailed focus on this windfarm allows us to start to 
consider the implications of these temporalities for how we understand projects as temporary 
organizations with reference to our exemplary concepts of risk and knowledge.  
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Greater Gabbard Offshore Windfarm  
 
 
In 2002 in the UK, the Crown Estates, as part of the UK Government’s commitment to 
achieving carbon emission reductions, auctioned a series of licences to establish large off-
shore wind farms to generate electricity. One of these licences was provided to establish an 
off-shore wind farm off the coast of South East England at a site called Greater Gabbard. 
This licence was purchased by an organization set up specifically to deliver a wind farm 
called Greater Gabbard Off-Shore Wind Ltd (GGOWL). The case of GGOWL provides 
exemplar features of a long-term project organization (an SPV) established to support a 
specific project; the relative longevity of the project; and significant perturbations in its 
‘permanent’ organizational milieu. Figure 2 shows the development of these.  
 
<<Insert Figure 2 here>> 
 
GGOWL was initially set-up as an SPV, which was organized as a joint venture between 
Airtricity (an entrepreneurial young organization based in the Republic of Ireland) and Fluor 
(a well-established contractor with a long record of large infrastructure project delivery). In 
the period 2003 – 2007, GGOWL successfully applied for all of the permits associated with 
the provision of an extremely large off-shore wind farm (The wind farm comprising ~150 
turbines has a capacity of 500MW, enough to power 530,000 homes in the UK).  
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The first perturbation in the ‘permanent organizations’ with which GGOWL was associated 
was the demise of Airtricity through its takeover by Scottish and Southern Electricity (SSE) 
in 2007. At this point the original owner of Airtricity left this megaproject completely to 
form another completely separate renewable energy company. SSE were then faced with 
developing an ongoing relationship with the other owner of GGOWL, Fluor. SSE resolved 
this issue by purchasing Fluor’s share of the GGOWL from Fluor for £40M. GGOWL, at the 
instigation of SSE, then contracted with Fluor to act as the EPC (engineer-procure-construct) 
contractor for the offshore wind farm (excluding turbine provision which was delivered by 
Siemens). The contract comprised a fixed sum agreement of $1.8bn. 
 
GGOWL underwent another change in ownership later in 2008 when SSE decided to sell 
50% of its shares in GGOWL to the German power utility company RWE for £308M. At 
this stage, therefore, GGOWL had experienced four owners in five years. Meanwhile, 
GGOWL had continued in its activity of delivering the offshore wind farm and in late 2008 
entered its construction phase. Once it entered its construction phase GGOWL began to 
experience substantive difficulties in its construction activity leading to a number of delays. 
Tier 1 subcontractors went bankrupt leaving large proportions of undersea cable to be laid. 
The foundations on which the turbines were located were provided by inexperienced sub-
contractors. Significant numbers of these were not to specification and had to be re-welded. 
These factors led to a delay in construction of the project of over eighteen months. As a 
result of these delays, in the last quarter of 2010, Fluor made provision in its accounts for 
losses of £340 million. The relationship between GGOWL and Fluor deteriorated even 
further and in 2011, Fluor sued GGOWL for £300m; a lawsuit which in 2013 Fluor were 
ultimately to settle outside court. 
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Despite these difficulties the Greater Gabbard wind farm was opened in July 2013 by the 
UK’s Energy Minister. This means that the GGOWL SPV has had an existence as a 
temporary organization for 11 years during which time it was responsible for the design and 
delivery of the wind farm. Over this time-period, GGOWL experienced the demise of one of 
its original ‘permanent’ organization owners (Airtricity) and has experienced substantive 
changes in the nature of its subsequent owners during this period; a Tier 1 subcontractor 
went bankrupt, and the relationship with Fluor changed from part ownership to EPC 
contractor to legal challenger, with GGOWL receiving a £300m claim and making counter 
claims1. The 2007 document setting out the plan for the eventual decommissioning of the 
wind farm states that:  
 
Whilst the design life for the project is 25 years, the lease term for is 50 years. As 
such, GGOWL’s expectation is that the project will be ‘re-powered’ midway through 
the lease term. In comparison to full decommissioning as described above, this is 
only likely to involve removing and replacing the turbine topsides and possibly some 
additional equipment, such as that on the transformer platforms.  
 
Nonetheless, GGOWL acknowledges the UK’s international obligations that require 
that installations are decommissioned as soon as is reasonably practicable. As such, 
adequate provisions must be in place to ensure that the project can be fully 
decommissioned at year 25 in order that Government is not exposed to unacceptable 
                                                          
1 See http://www.nabarro.com/clients/greater-gabbard-offshore-wind-ltd/case-study/ accessed 06/01/2017 
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risk. This programme therefore sets out the measures for decommissioning the 
project at year 25 (GGOWL, 2007: p. 52).  
 
The legal organization established as a long-term project organization to deliver the wind 
farm is now having a continued existence in operating the wind farm, and it is clear from 
associated documentation that the ‘project’ is understood by practitioners to be the full life-
cycle of the wind farm, rather than the delivery phase. The operational phase is due to last 
for the next 50 years during which GGOWL will continue to operate the wind farm and, 
ultimately, to be responsible for its safe decommissioning. This full ‘life for the project’ is 
planned at the outset, but although there is an intention for the project to end, the end-date 
continues to be negotiated within a shifting political environment.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
While extant research literature frames projects as “temporary organizations”, we argue that 
megaprojects may have very long initiation and delivery phases, which may last for many 
years, sometimes even decades, and they deliver capital assets that are used for decades or 
centuries. Thus the paper contributes by showing how, instead of a short-duration activity 
within a fixed organizational context, these projects involve multiple temporalities, with a 
range of more and less temporary forms of organizing combining in the process of enactment.  
 
Our case highlights how there are multiple temporalities associated with the project for 
Greater Gabbard Offshore Windfarm; particularly in relation to 1) the initiation and delivery 
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project; 2) the life cycle; 3) the stakeholder organizations that set up the project; and 4) the 
SPV through which it is delivered. First, the project itself might be considered in relation to 
the initiation and delivery project, the 11 years of the design and delivery of the Greater 
Gabbard wind farm.  
 
Second – as in the work of Alderman et al. (2014) and Brady et al. (2005) and the discourse 
of practitioners in our case – the project can also be considered as incorporating the full life-
cycle through use to decommissioning. The existence of the wind farm is time-limited: with a 
usage period of 25 or potentially 50 years, as implied in the quoted document (GGOWL, 
2007: p. 52), which indicates the expectation that “the project will be ‘repowered’” half way 
through the lease. Thus, from this second perspective, while there will be an end date for the 
overall scheme (and the GGOWL SPV), when this will be is left equivocal, with conflicting 
legislative and commercial reasons for a 25 or 50 year end-date. There is an expectation that 
this decision will be revisited and renegotiated when the project is in operation. Such use of 
the term ‘project’ for this wider life-cycle challenges existing understandings of a project as 
the delivery project. Yet, it fits the broader understandings of projects as temporary 
organizations due to their ex ante time duration and institutional termination (Bakker et al. 
2016; Jacobbson et al. 2015)  
   
Third, the organizational milieu of the project consists of organizations that, in this case, 
proved not to be permanent or enduring, either in their relationship with the project or as 
organizations. Fluor started as owner, acted as contractor and ultimately sued GGOWL. 
Airtricity was taken over by SSE. Thus in this case, we might contrast the longevity of the 
long-term delivery project with the more transient nature of the ‘permanent’ organization that 
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commissioned it. The firms associated with the project (SPV, owners, clients, supply-chain) 
exhibit different longevity of association with the project through the life-cycle; and different 
degrees of longevity or transience as firms. Changes in ownership represent a significant risk 
for the long-term project and need to be addressed as such by project managers. 
 
Fourth, the special purpose vehicle GGOWL is set up as a firm specifically for the project of 
Greater Gabbard Offshore Windfarm: both in delivery and in operations. It delivers the 
facility, and although given a 50 year lease, it is initially allowed a usage period of 25 years. 
Hence, while this, like the project, is a temporary organization, this SPV is relatively long-
lasting (36 years or more); and because of uncertainty regarding the end date of the project 
there is similar uncertainty relating to the longevity of the SPV as a firm.  
 
These temporal complexities pose important questions for how we might understand this 
project as a temporary organization, not least in terms of our exemplary concepts of risk and 
knowledge. For example, as introduced earlier in this paper, project risk is frequently 
understood as being generated by the unique task and time duration of a project as a 
temporary organization vis-à-vis its surrounding organizational milieu (Burke and Morley, 
2016; Hobday, 2000; Packendorff, 1995). The corresponding lack of an accumulated 
knowledge base and heightened level of distrust in projects has thus been suggested as 
reasons for increases in uncertainty, and the importance of risk management, in project-based 
organizing (Atkinson et al. 2006). Viewed as such, the mitigation of risk is said to require a 
stable project environment where known and emerging project risks can identified, calculated 
and controlled (PMBOK, 2013). The case of Greater Gabbard, and similar long-term 
infrastructural megaprojects, spanning several decades, suggests that such a stable 
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environment may be considerably more likely to reside within rather than outside the 
boundaries of the project. This project, and its SPV, while possessing a defined, or sought 
termination date, has already beyond its surrounding organizational milieu, and might readily 
be expected, according to the literature on knowledge in temporary organizations, to develop 
an accumulated knowledge base, and level of trust in that knowledge, by virtue of its slow, 
almost routine, development. Future research, especially perhaps practice-based research 
(Sanderson, 2012), could reveal whether this ‘flipping’ in the relative temporalities of 
project-environment organizing affords its members an increased level of control over not 
just endogenous project risks (as related to costs, time, scope etc.) but perhaps even 
exogenous risks that emerge within its surrounding organizational milieu. For example, 
research on such megaprojects might question to what extent, if at all, project members 
calculated, and sought to mitigate, the risk of changes in external ownership? The case of 
Greater Gabbard, where one on the original project sponsors left the project and then sued the 
project delivery firm, offers a salient reminder of the importance of such questions in 
managing risk and knowledge within such projects.  This line of thinking is not without 
precedent; indeed to some extent it dovetails with Lundin and Soderholm’s (1995) notably 
seldom discussed recommendation that all projects, as temporary organizations, should 
develop strategies of ‘planned isolation’ to guard themselves from a shifting organizational 
context and enable project control. Or conversely, perhaps in such troublesome cases, other 
less temporal features of megaproject organizing, such as unique task orientation and 
complex multi-disciplinary actors (Sanderson, 2012) continued to imbue project uncertainty 
and risk, and undermined any potential to manage external risks. Such important avenues for 
empirical research disappear from view when, as is customary across project management 
scholarship and practice, the external environment is assumed to be the stable platform for 
managing project risk and knowledge. 
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In a similar vein the shifting temporalities of Greater Gabbard, and similar long-term 
megaprojects, also throw into relief challenges and opportunities to the projects as temporary 
organizations literature related to knowledge. To recall the arguments set out earlier in this 
paper, there is a pervasive view within this literature that projects exhibit a ‘learning paradox’ 
(Bakker et al. 2011): while the time-limit temporary organizing of projects is an important 
conduit for knowledge generation it can substantially impede knowledge sharing. A defining 
feature of recent research on this topic is the central importance given towards a ‘permanent’ 
organizational milieu in overcoming the ‘learning paradox’ of projects is similarly given in 
other research (e.g. Brady and Davies, 2004; Grabher, 2004; Maaninen-Olsson and Müllern, 
2009). As Scarborough et al (2004) explain, ‘while projects are potentially important sites for 
the generation of learning, the nature, scope and applicability of such learning is ultimately 
shaped to a large extent by the ongoing learning activities of the wider organization’ (p1597). 
The case of Greater Gabbard introduces a productive problematization of the root assumption 
at work here. That is, there exists, an ever-increasing number of megaprojects (Brookes and 
Sainati, 2015), that, while time bound projects, might endure, and be perceived to endure, far 
beyond their time-indefinite organizational milieu. This introduces important questions 
around how knowledge is generated and then shared in such long-term temporary 
organizations. Might, for example, a long-term infrastructural megaproject project with a 
termination point several decades away become a focus for knowledge sharing across a more 
dynamic organizational milieu? Or instead, does such a project remain a focus for knowledge 
exploration not exploitation (Davies and Brady, 2004)? And indeed, what role do the relative 
temporalities, and perceptions of the relative temporalities, between the lifespans of, for 
example – project infrastructure (in our case turbine blades, generators, foundations) – SPVs 
(GGOWL) – sponsoring organizations (SSE, Fluor) – sub-contractors and organizational 
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members careers – play in the extent to which a megaproject enables knowledge generation 
or sharing? Such questions remainhidden from view by an assumed dichotomy, including that 
given in the notion of the ‘learning paradox’ itself, where knowledge generation occurs in 
temporary organizations and knowledge sharing in wider, permanent, organizational context 
(Brady and Davies, 2004; Burke and Morley, 2016; Grabher, 2004; Hobday, 2000; 
Scarborough et al. 2004; Sydow et al. 2004). While seemingly intuitive, such dichotomous 
thinking seems to simply stem from the discursive connotation that permanence is defined as 
relatively long-term organizing (instead of time-indefinite – Bakker et al. 2016; Jacobbson et 
al. 2015). By considering megaprojects that outlive their organizational milieu we can start to 
challenge such assumptions, and by extension pursue a fuller consideration of the 
implications of what it means to consider projects as temporary organizations because they 
are time-bound not relatively short-term (Bakker et al. 2016). 
 
In developing new theoretical understanding of the multiple, relative, temporalities of long-
term infrastructural megaprojects, and perhaps other long-term projects, we find the notion of 
‘permanent organizations’ against which ‘temporary organizations’ are often juxtaposed in 
the existing literature, to be inherently problematic. As the example of knowledge and risk 
above indicates, far too frequently the notion of ‘permanent organization’, remains, despite 
caveats to the contrary (Bakker et al. 2016), associated with notions of relative longevity 
rather than time-boundedness. As we have been at pains to argue here, these discursively 
constructed temporal connotations continue to have a lasting and troubling legacy in veiling 
from view important avenues for contributions that temporary organizing researchers might 
make towards understandings of the temporalities of megaprojects. Our view is that any 
understanding of permanence is itself, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, temporary as (like 
any temporality) it is contingent: enacted in particular places and times. We contend that it is 
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thus necessary to problematize and unpack the notion of permanence to avoid simplistic 
temporal dichotomies and to better theorise and understand temporal phenomena across 
different, interacting, timescales. ‘Permanence’, the perception of a time-indefinite, 
consistent, organizational form, might be thus considered as a distinct temporality that is 
itself performed, whether in scholarly work or in practice, through an opposition with a time-
limited organization. But, empirically, this time-limit does not necessarily imply a relatively 
shorter perceived duration. Indeed while an organizational form might be perceived as time 
indefinite, it is still perceived against a life expectancy range within which its termination is 
likely (De Geus, 2002). The knowledge that the foundations at Greater Gabbard will have to 
be decommissioned at a fixed point in several decades does not negate the plausibility that 
‘parent’ organizations are likely to have, by then, been merged or dissolved, careers 
completed and lives lived. When viewed against such temporal complexities the most crucial 
point to conjoin our argument to the projects as temporary organization research, and indeed 
the wider temporary organization literature, is a renewed need for greater consideration of the 
relative, multiple temporalities of organizing. It is the ecology of relative temporalities 
between organizational forms and actors (human and potentially nonhuman), which defines 
the troublesome case of megaprojects. And, indeed, relative to other temporary organization 
research it is this contribution that appears most fruitful in the development of further theories 
of temporary organizing (Bakker et al. 2016). 
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